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Abstract 
 There	is	some	evidence	that	disordered	self-processing	in	autism	spectrum	disorders	(ASD)	is	linked	to	the	social	impairments	characteristic	of	the	condition.	To	investigate	whether	bodily	self-consciousness	is	altered	in	ASD	as	a	result	of	multisensory	processing	differences,	we	tested	responses	to	the	full	body	illusion	(FBI)	and	measured	peripersonal	space	(PPS)	in	22	adults	with	ASD	and	29	neurotypical	adults.	In	the	FBI	setup,	participants	wore	a	head	mounted	display	showing	a	view	of	their	'virtual	body'	being	stroked	synchronously	or	asynchronously	with	respect	to	felt	stroking	on	their	back.	After	stroking,	we	measured	the	drift	in	perceived	self-location	and	self-identification	with	the	virtual	body.	To	assess	the	PPS	boundary	we	employed	an	audiotactile	reaction	time	task.	Results	showed	that	participants	with	ASD	are	markedly	less	susceptible	to	the	FBI,	not	demonstrating	the	illusory	self-identification	and	self-location	drift.	Strength	of	self-identification	was	negatively	correlated	with	severity	of	autistic	traits	and	contributed	positively	to	empathy	scores.	Results	also	demonstrated	a	significantly	smaller	PPS,	with	a	sharper	(steeper)	boundary,	in	ASD	participants.	These	results	suggest	that	bodily	self-	consciousness	is	altered	in	participants	with	ASD	due	to	differences	in	multisensory	integration,	and	this	may	be	linked	to	deficits	in	social	functioning.		
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Introduction		Autism	 has	 long	 been	 described	 as	 a	 disorder	 of	 self	 (Asperger	&	 Frith,	 1991;	Frith,	2003;	Kanner,	1943).	Many	studies	have	shown	altered	self	processing	in	ASD,	 for	 example,	 weaker	 autobiographical	memory	 (Crane	 &	 Goddard,	 2008)	and	self-referenced	memory	(Henderson	et	al.,	2009),	deficits	in	emotional	self-awareness	(Hill,	Berthoz,	&	Frith,	2004),	 lower	recognition	and	display	of	 ‘self-conscious’	 emotions	 (Heerey,	Keltner,	&	Capps,	2003),	 atypical	use	of	personal	pronouns	(Lee,	Hobson,	&	Chiat,	1994),	and	impairments	in	other	aspects	of	self-referential	 cognition	 (Lombardo,	 Barnes,	 Wheelwright,	 &	 Baron-Cohen,	 2007;	Mundy,	Gwaltney,	&	Henderson,	2010).		At	the	root	of	a	cognitively	 ‘high	level’	conceptual	sense	of	self	 is	a	more	basic,	non-conceptual	sense	of	self	that	is	grounded	in	neural	representations	of	the	 body	 (Bermúdez,	 2018;	 Damasio,	 2012).	 Basic	 bodily	 self-consciousness	emerges	 from	 the	 integration	 of	 sensory	 signals,	 within	 and	 across	 different	modalities,	 generating	 the	 feeling	 that	 we	 are	 located	 within	 a	 body	 (self-location)	that	we	own	and	control,	and	determines	the	first-person	perspective	from	 which	 we	 experience	 the	 world	 (Blanke,	 2012;	 Maselli	 &	 Slater,	 2013;	Serino	 et	 al.,	 2013).	 Surprisingly,	 the	 bodily	 self	 in	 ASD	 has	 received	 little	research	attention	 to	date.	Here,	we	addressed	 these	 issues,	 by	measuring	and	manipulating	the	multisensory	bodily	self	in	ASD.	The	bodily	self	has	been	extensively	studied	using	different	paradigms	in	which	multisensory	 conflicts	 are	 used	 to	manipulate	 it,	 -	 i.e.,	 the	 rubber	 hand	illusion	 and	 full	 body	 illusion	 (Botvinick	 &	 Cohen,	 1998;	 Ehrsson,	 2007;	Lenggenhager,	 Tadi,	 Metzinger,	 &	 Blanke,	 2007),	 and	 multisensory	 tasks	 that	measure	 peripersonal	 space	 (PPS;	 Canzoneri	 et	 al.,	 2013;	 Serino	 et	 al.,	 2013;	
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Serino	et	al.,	2018).	Supported	by	studies	 that	show	that	PPS	and	the	FBI	arise	from	multisensory	integration	processes	(Aspell,	Palluel	&	Blanke,	2012;	Avillac,	Denève,	 Olivier,	 Pouget,	 &	 Duhamel,	 2005;	 Bernasconi	 et	 al.,	 2018),	 these	experiments	 importantly	suggest	 that	 the	bodily	self	 is	malleable.	For	example,	the	rubber	hand	illusion	(RHI)	elicits	the	illusion	that	the	dummy	hand	is	one’s	own	hand	 (change	 in	 body-part	 ownership).	 Similarly,	 in	 the	 full	 body	 illusion	(FBI),	viewing	a	virtual	body	being	stroked	whilst	feeling	synchronous	stroking	on	one’s	own	body,	results	in	a	feeling	of	ownership	for,	referral	of	touch	to	and	a	drift	 in	 self-location	 towards	 the	virtual	body	 (Aspell,	 Lenggenhager,	&	Blanke,	2009;	 Lenggenhager	 et	 al.,	 2007).	 Recently,	 it	 has	 also	 been	 shown	 that	peripersonal	 space	 (PPS)	 -	 the	 space	 immediately	 around	 the	 body,	 which	mediates	 our	 interaction	 with	 external	 objects	 that	 come	 within	 reach	(Rizzolatti,	 Fadiga,	 Fogassi,	 &	 Gallese,	 1997)	 -	 is	 extended	 towards	 the	 virtual	body	 during	 the	 FBI,	 confirming	 that	 the	 PPS	 is	 ‘the	 space	 of	 the	 bodily	 self’	(Noel,	 Pfeiffer,	 Blanke,	 &	 Serino,	 2015;	 Salomon	 et	 al.,	 2017;	 Riva,	 2018;	Rizzolatti	et	al.,	1997).		Differentiation	 between	 self	 and	 other	 underlies	 the	 development	 of	social	 interaction	 (Decety	 &	 Chaminade,	 2003;	 Gallagher	 &	 Meltzoff,	 1996;	Neisser,	1991;	Palmer	&	Tsakiris,	2018).	Indeed,	in	ASD,	observed	differences	in	the	 ‘higher	 level’	 aspects	 of	 self	 may	 relate	 to	 some	 of	 the	 social	 deficits	(Gillespie-Smith,	Ballantyne,	Branigan,	Turk,	&	Cunningham,	2017;	Henderson	et	al.,	 2009;	 Lombardo	 et	 al.,	 2007).	 However,	 the	 possible	 relationship	 between	bodily	 self-consciousness	 and	 impairments	 in	 social	 interaction	 have	 not	 been	investigated	in	ASD.		
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Susceptibility	 to	 body	 illusions	 may	 be	 an	 indirect	 measure	 of	 the	tendency	to	blur	the	distinction	between	self	and	other.	People	who	tend	to	feel	other	 people’s	 pain	 more	 easily	 are	 more	 susceptible	 to	 the	 RHI	 (Derbyshire,	Osborn,	&	Brown,	2013).	Highly	empathic	persons	show	higher	susceptibility	to	the	 RHI	 and	 experience	 more	 vicarious	 pain	 for	 a	 rubber	 hand	 (Seiryte	 &	Rusconi,	 2015).	 The	 size	 of	 the	 PPS	 also	 appears	 to	 reflect	 the	 differentiation	between	self	and	other,	as	shown	by	the	expansion	of	the	PPS	towards	an	other	in	 social	 interactions	 (Cardellicchio,	 Sinigaglia,	 &	 Costantini,	 2012;	 Teneggi,	Canzoneri,	 di	 Pellegrino,	 &	 Serino,	 2013),	 and	 even	 a	 remapping	 of	 another	person’s	 PPS	 onto	 one’s	 own	 (Maister,	 Cardini,	 Zamariola,	 Serino,	 &	 Tsakiris,	2015).	Together,	 these	 results	 suggest	 that	altered	bodily	 self-consciousness	 in	ASD	may	underpin	at	least	some	of	the	social	impairments	seen	in	ASD.		Key	 aspects	 of	 bodily	 self-consciousness	 (Blanke,	 2012)	 –	 self-identification	 with	 one’s	 entire	 body	 and	 self-location	 –	 have	 not	 been	researched	 in	 autism.	 To	 date,	 only	 three	 studies	 have	 investigated	 body	ownership	 in	ASD	 (in	 relation	 to	body	parts),	 using	 the	RHI	 (Cascio,	 Foss-Feig,	Burnette,	 Heacock,	 &	 Cosby,	 2012;	 Paton,	 Hohwy,	 &	 Enticott,	 2012)	 and	 the	‘numbness	 illusion’	 (Guerra,	 Spoto,	 Parma,	 Straulino,	&	Castiello,	 2017).	 Cascio	and	 colleagues	 (2012)	 found	 that	 children	 with	 ASD	 required	 a	 much	 longer	stroking	duration	for	the	illusion	to	establish,	whilst	Paton	and	colleagues	(2012)	found	 that	 the	 ASD	 group	 displayed	 reduced	 proprioceptive	 drift	 towards	 the	rubber	 hand.	 The	 FBI,	 an	 illusion	 that	 manipulates	 body	 ownership	 (self-identification)	 and	 self-location,	 is	 arguably	 a	 more	 effective	 and	 conceptually	appropriate	 way	 of	 investigating	 the	 bodily	 self	 than	 the	 RHI	 -	 in	 which	ownership	of	 a	 single	body	part	 is	 altered	 -	 since	one	 identifies	one’s	 self	with	
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one’s	whole	body,	rather	than	with	a	body	part	(Blanke	&	Metzinger,	2009).		Yet	the	FBI	has	not	been	investigated	in	ASD.		PPS	has	also	not	been	tested	 in	people	with	ASD	before,	although	it	has	been	suggested,	based	on	the	RHI	studies,	 that	the	PPS	of	 individuals	with	ASD	may	be	sharper	and	smaller	than	in	the	typical	population	(Noel,	Cascio,	Wallace,	&	 Park,	 2017).	 This	might	manifest	 as	 a	 steeper	 gradient	 from	 self	 to	 other:	 a	reduced	 distance	 over	 which	 multisensory	 stimuli	 approaching	 PPS	 are	integrated,	reflecting	less	flexibility	in	the	PPS	when	interacting	with	the	external	world	 (Noel	 et	 al.,	 2017).	 This	 is	 in	 line	 with	 reports	 of	 individuals	 with	 ASD	having	 difficulty	 respecting	 the	 personal	 space	 of	 others	 (Kennedy	&	 Adolphs,	2014)	and	as	more	likely	to	approach	other	individuals	too	closely	(Asada	et	al.,	2016;	 Parsons,	Mitchell,	 &	 Leonard,	 2004).	 It	may	 also	 be	 inferred	 from	 these	behaviours	that	the	size	of	their	PPS	is	smaller	than	in	typical	individuals.	To	summarize,	we	investigated,	for	the	first	time,	multisensory	bodily	self	-consciousness	 in	 individuals	with	ASD	using	 the	FBI	 and	 a	PPS	measurement.	We	expected	to	find	evidence	of	altered	bodily	self-consciousness	in	individuals	with	ASD,	manifesting	as	a	reduced	susceptibility	 to	the	FBI,	and	a	smaller	PPS	with	steeper	gradient.	We	also	expected	 there	would	be	a	positive	relationship	between	empathy	and	susceptibility	to	the	FBI,	supporting	previous	suggestions	that	the	representation	of	the	bodily	self	contributes	to	social	functioning.			
Methods	
Participants	Twenty-two	participants	with	ASD	and	29	participants	without	 	ASD,	making	a	total	of	51	participants	(30	male),	were	recruited	(mean	age	27.1,	age	range	18-
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53).	 Forty-seven	 participants	 completed	 all	 parts	 and	 four	 (neurotypical)	participants	completed	the	PPS	task	only.		The	22	ASD		participants	(14	male,	8	female)	 had	 a	 formal	 diagnosis	 of	 ASD	 given	 by	 an	 independent	 clinician.	 To	confirm	 diagnosis,	 19	 of	 these	 participants	 attended	 an	 Autism	 Diagnostic	Observation	Schedule	diagnostic	interview	(ADOS	-	Lord	et	al.,	2000)	with	one	of	the	 authors	 (SS),	 and	 four	 met	 the	 threshold	 point	 for	 an	 autism	 spectrum	diagnosis,	 while	 15	 met	 the	 threshold	 for	 autism.	 The	 three	 participants	 who	were	not	 able	 to	 attend	 the	ADOS	 interview	scored	well	 above	 the	ASD	cut-off	point	 of	 32	 on	 the	 AQ	 screening	 questionnaire	 (Baron-Cohen,	 Wheelwright,	Skinner,	 Martin,	 &	 Clubley,	 2001).	 Participants	 were	 matched	 on	 age,	 ASD	M	(SD)=	27.0	 (9.0);	non-ASD	M	 (SD)	=	27.2	 (6.7),	 t	(49)	=	0.11,	p	=	0.91),	 and	 IQ,	(ASD	M	 (SD)=	 110.1	 (13.0);	 non-ASD	M	 (SD)	 =	 112.7	 (12.2),	 t	(45)	 =	 0.70,	p	=	0.49),	 as	 measured	 with	 the	 WASI	 II	 (Wechsler,	 2011).	 All	 participants	 gave	written	informed	consent	to	participate	and	the	study	was	approved	by	the	local	ethics	committee	and	conducted	in	accordance	with	the	ethical	standards	of	the	1964	Declaration	of	Helsinki.		
Materials	and	Procedure	(i)	Questionnaires	All	participants	 completed	 the	Autism	Quotient	 (Baron-Cohen	et	 al.,	 2001),	 the	Toronto	Alexithymia	Scale	(Bagby,	Parker,	&	Taylor,	1994),,	the	Questionnaire	of	Affective	 and	 Cognitive	 Empathy	 (Reniers,	 Corcoran,	 Drake,	 Shryane,	 &	 Völlm,	2011),	and	the	Multidimensional	Assessment	of	Interoceptive	Awareness	(MAIA	-	Mehling	et	al.,	2012)	measuring	awareness	of	 internal	bodily	sensations.	 	The	MAIA	has	8	subscales	that	cannot	be	combined.	We	were	primarily	interested	in	
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the	 subscale	 ‘Noticing’,	 which	 measures	 awareness	 of	 comfortable,	uncomfortable	 and	 neutral	 body	 sensations,	 and	 the	 subscale	 ‘Attention	Regulation’,	which	measures	the	ability	to	sustain	and	control	attention	to	body	sensations	when	they	are	competing	with	exteroceptive	signals,	and	so	focus	on	these	in	the	analyses.		(ii)	Full	Body	Illusion		Participants	wore	an	Oculus	Rift	CV1	VR	head	mounted	display	(HMD)	and	were	positioned	2.3m	 in	 front	of	a	video	camera	 in	 the	body	condition.	 In	 the	object	condition,	 participants	 stood	 1.0m	 to	 the	 side	 of	 a	 tall	 cardboard	 box	 with	 a	height	 and	width	 similar	 to	 a	 person’s	 body.	 The	 box	was	 positioned	 2.3m	 in	front	 of	 the	 camera,	 such	 that	 the	 participant	 was	 out	 of	 view.	 The	 HMD	displayed	the	body	of	the	participant	from	the	back	in	the	body	conditions,	or	the	box	in	the	object	conditions	(see	Figure	1).			
Autism	(in	press)	
	 9	
	
Figure	1.	FBI	set-up	for	the	body	condition	(A)	and	the	object	condition	(B).			 A	custom-made	program	in	Unity	software	was	used	to	control	the	timing	of	the	visual	feed	to	the	HMD.		Four	conditions	were	presented	in	random	order:	body	 synchronous,	 body	 asynchronous,	 object	 synchronous	 and	 object	asynchronous.	 In	 the	 asynchronous	 conditions,	 the	 visual	 feed	was	 delayed	 by	400ms,	 while	 there	 was	 no	 discernible	 delay	 (<50ms)	 in	 the	 synchronous	condition).	 In	 the	 body	 conditions,	 the	 experimenter	 stroked	 the	 back	 of	 the	participant	 for	 two	 minutes	 with	 a	 stick.	 In	 the	 object	 conditions,	 the	experimenter	stroked	the	back	of	the	participant	and	the	box	simultaneously	in	a	spatially	congruent	manner	for	two	minutes,	using	two	sticks.	The	experimenter	was	out	of	view	in	all	conditions.	After	each	condition,	participants	were	asked	to	
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close	their	eyes,	and	the	HMD	was	removed.	They	were	guided	backwards	by	a	distance	of	1.5m	 in	very	small	 steps,	and	 then	asked	 to	return	 to	 their	original	position	 in	 normal	 steps,	 while	 keeping	 their	 eyes	 closed.	 The	 drift	 in	 self-location	was	measured	as	the	distance	 in	centimetres	between	the	original	and	estimated	 position.	 The	 FBI	 questionnaire	 (Lenggenhager	 et	 al.,	 2007)	 was	administered	after	each	 condition.	 It	 contained	 seven	 statements	 (see	Table	1)	with	which	participants	could	agree/disagree	on	a	seven	point	Likert	scale	from	---	 to	 +++.	 The	 midpoint	 was	 assigned	 zero.	 The	 order	 of	 the	 items	 was	randomised.			
Table	1.	FBI	Questionnaire	items.	Q1,	Q2	and	Q3	are	illusion	items	and	Q4-Q7	are	
control	items.		 Statements	During	the	experiment	there	were	times	when:	Q1	 It	seemed	as	if	I	were	feeling	the	touch	of	the	stick	in	the	location	where	I	saw	the	virtual	body	touched.	Q2	 It	 seemed	 as	 though	 the	 touch	 I	 felt	 was	 caused	 by	 the	 stick	 touching	 the	virtual	body.	Q3	 It	felt	as	if	the	virtual	body	was	my	body.	Q4	 It	felt	as	if	my	(real)	body	was	drifting	towards	the	front	(towards	the	virtual	body).	Q5	 It	 seemed	 as	 if	 the	 touch	 I	 was	 feeling	 came	 from	 somewhere	 between	my	own	body	and	the	virtual	body.	Q6		 It	appeared	(visually)	as	if	the	virtual	body	was	drifting	backwards	(towards	my	body).	
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Q7	 It	seemed	as	if	I	might	have	more	than	one	body.			(iii)	Peripersonal	space	Peripersonal	 space	 was	 measured	 prior	 to	 the	 FBI	 experiment	 –	 using	 an	audiotactile	 integration	 task	 (Canzoneri,	 Magosso,	 &	 Serino,	 2012).	 A	 custom	built	small	 tapper	attached	to	 the	right	middle	 finger	was	used	to	administer	a	small	tap	(the	drop	of	a	4mm	magnet).	Participants	were	seated	and	blindfolded	and	responded	as	fast	as	possible	to	the	tap	by	pressing	a	button	with	their	left	hand.	 Participants	were	 told	 to	 ignore	 a	 sound	 (a	 pink	 noise)	 present	 in	 each	trial.	 This	 sound	was	 emitted	 from	 loudspeakers,	 one	 next	 to	 the	 participant’s	right	hand	and	one	1	m	further	away.	Modulation	of	the	sound’s	volume	resulted	in	the	impression	of	the	sound	moving	towards	them	(Maister	et	al.,	2015).	Taps	were	administered	at	300ms,	800ms,	1500ms,	2200ms	and	2500ms	after	sound	onset.	Arduino	board	and	LabView	8	(National	Instruments,	Austin,	TX)	software	were	used	to	control	the	sound,	onset	delay	of	the	tap	and	record	reaction	times	(RTs).	There	were	65	randomised	trials	in	total,	10	for	each	onset	delay,	and	15	no-tap	catch	trials.			
Results	
(i)	Empathy,	Alexithymia	and	Interoception	Questionnaires	Non-ASD	 and	 ASD	 participants	 scored	 significantly	 differently	 on	 the	questionnaires	 that	 measured	 autistic	 traits	 (AQ),	 empathy	 (QCAE),	 cognitive	empathy	 (QCAEcog),	 alexithymia	 (TAS20)	 and	 the	 MAIA	 subscale	 of	 attention	
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regulation.	No	differences	between	groups	were	observed	for	affective	empathy	(QCAEaff)	nor	the	other	MAIA	subscales	(see	Table	2).			
Table	 2.	 	Means,	 standard	 deviations	 and	 comparisons	 between	 groups	 of	 questionnaire	
responses	measuring	autistic	traits	(AQ),	alexithymia	(TAS-20),	empathy	(QCAE),	cognitive	
empathy	 (subscale	 of	 QCAE),	 affective	 empathy	 (subscale	 of	 QCAE),	 and	 interoceptive	
awareness	(subscales	of	MAIA).			 Non-ASD	 ASD	 Difference		Measure	 M	(SD)	 M	(SD)	 Mann-Whitney		U	 p	Autistic	traits	 14.5	(5.8)	 33.3	(7.3)	 7.0	 <	.001*	Alexithymia	 43.9	(12.9)	 61.6	(11.4)	 90	 <	.001*	Empathy	 96.2	(10.2)	 40.9	(10.7)	 39.5	 <	.001*					Cognitive	empathy	 61.5	(8.2)	 40.9	(6.2)	 39	 <	.001*					Affective	empathy	 34.6	(4.4)	 33.0	(6.2)	 220.5	 .24	MAIA	noticing	 3.4	(0.9)	 2.7	(1.2)	 175.5	 .03	MAIA	attention	regulation	 2.9	(0.7)	 2.0	(1.1)	 131	 .002*	Note:	*	p	<	.007	(Bonferroni	corrected	alpha-level)	
	
		(ii)	Full	Body	Illusion	-	Drift	Participant’s	 drift	 in	 self-location	 was	 measured	 as	 the	 distance	 of	 the	participant’s	estimated	self-location	from	the	original	position	where	they	stood	during	 the	 stroking.	 Subsequently,	 the	 difference	 in	 self-location	 drift	 between	
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synchronous	 and	 asynchronous	 conditions	 was	 calculated	 by	 subtracting	 the	drift	 in	 self-location	 of	 the	 participant	 in	 the	 asynchronous	 condition	 from	 the	drift	 in	 self-location	 of	 the	 participant	 in	 the	 synchronous	 condition.	 The	subtracted	 drift	 measurement	 was	 calculated	 because	 of	 the	 large	 variance	between	participants	in	the	estimates.	Participants	without	ASD	showed	an	average	subtracted	(synch-	asynch)	self-location	 drift	 in	 body	 conditions	 of	 12.8	 cm	 	 (SD	 =	 29.6).	 For	 ASD	participants	subtracted	drift	measurement	for	body	conditions	was	0.3	cm	(SD	=	16.1).	 In	 the	 object	 conditions,	 non-ASD	 participants’	 subtracted	 drift	measurement	was	-4.9	cm		(SD	=	5.4)	whereas	ASD	participants’	subtracted	drift	measurement	was	2.7	cm	(SD	=	8.2).			For	the	body	condition	the	subtracted	self-location	drift	measurement	of	non-ASD	participants	compared	to	that	of	ASD	participants	was	significant,	t	(45)	=	1.77,	p	=	 .04,	while	 for	 the	object	conditions,	 the	difference	 in	 the	subtracted	drift	measurement	between	groups	was	non-significant,	t	(45)	=	0.80,	p	=	.43.	See	Figure	2	for	individual	scores	and	see	Figure	3	for	mean	scores.	[Insert	Figure	2	here]	[Insert	Figure	3	here]	
	
	
(iii)	Full	Body	Illusion	–	questionnaire	The	scale	of	the	questionnaire	was	transformed	from	---	to	+++	into	a	scale	from	1	to	7,	with	the	‘neutral’	mid-point	acquiring	a	value	of	4.	For	the	analysis	of	the	questionnaire	 scores,	we	 assessed	 a	 possible	 response	 bias	 by	 calculating,	 per	participant,	an	average	score	for	the	responses	to	the	four	control	items	for	each	condition,	and	we	did	 the	same	 for	 the	 three	 illusion	 items	(as	 in,	e.g.	Ehrsson,	
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2007).	 For	 all	 main	 ANOVA	 analyses,	 the	 data	 was	 transformed	 using	 ARTool	aligned	rank	transform	software	(Wobbrock		Findlater,	Gergle	&	Higgins,	2011)	to	enable	nonparametric	factorial	analysis	using	ANOVAs.		A	 four-way	ANOVA	 (Question	 type	 x	 Synchrony	 x	Display	 x	ASD	 status)	showed	a	main	effect	of	Question	type	(illusion	vs	control),	F	(1,	45)	=	92,27,	p	<	.001,	η2p		=	.67,	a	main	effect	of	Synchrony,	F	(1,	45)	=	15.80,	p	<	.001,	η2p		=	.26,	a	main	effect	of	Display,	F	(1,	45)	=	9.30,	p		=	.004,	η2p		=	.17,	and	no	main	effect	of	ASD	status,	F	(1,	45)	=	.09,	p	=	.77,	η2p		=	.002.	There	were	 several	 significant	 interaction	 effects:	 of	 Question	 type	 and	Synchrony	F	(1,	45)	=	30.36,	p	<	.001,	η2p		=	.40,	of	ASD	status	and	Synchrony,	F	(1,	45)	=	4.43,	p		=	 .04,	η2p		=	 .09,	and	of	Question	type	and	Display,	F	 (1,	45)	=	11.51,	 p	 	 =	 .001,	η2p	 	 =	 .20.	 One	 three-way	 interaction,	 ASD	 x	 Question	 type	 x	Synchrony,	 approached	 significance,	 F	 (1,	 45)	 =	 3.38,	 p	 =	 .07,	 η2p	 	 =	 .07.	 The	remaining	interactions	were	non-significant:	Question	type	x	ASD	x	Synchrony	x	Display,	F	(1,	45)	=	1.63,	p	=	.21,	η2p		=	.04	;	Question	type	x	Display	x	synchrony,	
F	(1,	45)	=	.049,	p	=	.49,	η2p		=	.01;	ASD	x	Synchrony	x	Display,	F	(1,	45)	=	3.06,	p	=	.09,	η2p		=	 .06;	ASD	x	Question	type,	F	 (1,	45)	=	0.02,	p	=	 .88,	η2p		<	 .001;	ASD	x	Display,	F	(1,	45)	=	1.35,	p	=	.25,	η2p		=	 .03;	ASD	x	Question	type	x	Display,	F	(1,	45)	=	0.003,	p	=	.95,	η2p		<	.001;	Display	x	Synchrony,	F	(1,	45)	=	0.27,	p	=	.61,	η2p		=	.006.	In	order	 to	check	 for	differences	 in	response	bias	 in	 the	 two	groups,	we	conducted	a	2	x	2	x	2	(ASD	x	Synchrony	x	Display)	mixed	Anova	on	the	control	questions	only.	This	showed	there	was	no	significant	main	effect	of	ASD,	F	(3,	45)	=	 .11,	 	p	=	.95,	η2p	=	 .001,	nor	interactions	of	Display	x	ASD,	F	(3,	45)	=	 .67,	 	p	=	
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.57,	η2p	=	 .01,	 and	 Synchrony	 x	 ASD,	 F	(3,	 45)	 =	 .16,	 	p	=	 .91,	η2p	=	 .004,	 nor	 a	three-way	interaction	of	Synchrony	x	Display	x	ASD,	F	(3,	45)	=	.14,		p	=	.94,	η2p	=	.003,	 indicating	 that	 the	 two	groups	 responded	 in	 a	 similar	way	 to	 the	 control	questions	and	a	correction	for	a	response	bias	was	unnecessary.		 Planned	 comparisons	with	Wilcoxon	 signed	 ranks	 tests	 showed	 that	 for	the	 non-ASD	 participants,	 the	 average	 ratings	 for	 the	 illusion	 questions	 in	 the	synchronous	body	condition	were	significantly	higher,	M	(SD)	=	5.53	(1.12),	than	in	 the	 asynchronous	 body	 condition,	M	 (SD)	 =	 3.97	 (1.70),	 Z	 =	 3.33,	 p	=	 .001.	However,	ASD	participants’	ratings	in	the	synchronous	body	condition,	M	(SD)	=	4.63	 (1.64)	 were	 not	 significantly	 different	 from	 their	 ratings	 in	 the	asynchronous	body	condition,	M	(SD)	=	4.26	(1.64),	Z	=	 .64,	p	=	.52.	Concerning	the	 average	 ratings	 for	 illusion	 items	 in	 the	 object	 conditions,	 non-ASD	participants’	 ratings	were	 significantly	 higher	 in	 the	 synchronous	 condition,	M	(SD)	=	4.4	(1.4)	than	the	asynchronous	condition,	M	(SD)	=	3.1	(1.4),	Z	=	3.60,	p	=	.001.	 ASD	 participants	 also	 had	 significantly	 higher	 scores	 in	 the	 synchronous	condition	M	 (SD)	 =	 4.3	 (2.0)	 than	 in	 the	 asynchronous	 condition,	M	 (SD)	 =	 3.5	(2.0),	Z	=	2.78,	p	=	.005,	when	viewing	the	object.		To	 further	 explore	 the	 data	 we	 examined	 differences	 in	 ratings	 for	 the	‘self-identification’	 question,	 Q3	 (‘It	 felt	 as	 if	 the	 body/object	 was	 my	 body’).	Wilcoxon	 signed	 ranks	 tests	 were	 planned	 per	 group	 for	 Q3,	 comparing	 the	synchronous	 vs	 asynchronous	 for	 the	 body	 and	 object.	 The	 alpha-level	 was	Bonferroni	corrected	to	.012.		In	response	to	Q3	Wilcoxon	signed	ranks	tests	showed	that	the	response	of	non-ASD	participants	in	the	synchronous	body	condition,	M	(SD)	=	5.76	(1.39),	was	significantly	higher	than	in	the	asynchronous	body	condition,	M	(SD)	=	4.32	
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(2.10),	Z	=	3.07,	p	=	.001.	However,	for	ASD	participants,	the	difference	between	the	 synchronous	 body	 condition,	M	 (SD)	 =	 3.86	 (2.42)	 and	 the	 asynchronous	body	condition,	M	(SD)	=	4.68	(2.01)	was	not	significant,	Z	=	0.64,	p		=	.52.	In	the	object	conditions,	non-ASD	participants	showed	a	significant	difference,	showing	higher	 ratings	 in	 the	 synchronous	 condition	M	 (SD)	 =	 3.40	 (2.24)	 than	 in	 the	asynchronous	condition,	M	(SD)	=	2.40	(1.76),	Z	=	2.64,	p	=	.008.	In	contrast,	ASD	participants	 showed	 similar	 levels	 of	 self-identification	 with	 the	 object	 in	 the	synchronous	condition	M	(SD)	=	3.50	(2.58)	as	in	the	asynchronous	condition	M	(SD)	=	2.91	(2.16),	Z	=	1.08,	p	=	.28	(see	Figure	4).	[Insert	Figure	4]			
(iv)	Peripersonal	Space	Participants’	RTs	were	recorded	per	tapping	delay	after	sound	onset.	Trials	that	were	faster	or	slower	than	2.5	SD	of	their	average	RT	for	that	onset	delay	were	removed	(fewer	than	5%	of	all	trials).	The	data	of	two	non-ASD	participants	was	rejected	due	to	equipment	malfunction.	A	 2	 x	 5	mixed	 ANOVA,	with	 ASD	 status	 (ASD	 vs	 non-ASD	 participants)	 as	 the	between	subjects	factor,	and	Tap	Delay	after	sound	onset	as	the	within	subjects	factor	 (300ms,	800ms,	1500ms,	2200ms,	2500ms)	was	 run.	Results	 revealed	 a	significant	main	effect	of	Tap	Delay,	F	(4,	47)	=	25.51,	p	<	 .001,	η2p	=	 .35	and	a	significant	main	effect	of	ASD	status:	ASD	participants	tended	to	have	slower	RTs	than	non-ASD	participants,	F	(4,	47)	=	7.11,	p	=	.01,	η2p	=		.13	and	RTs	tended	to	become	 faster	 with	 each	 consecutive	 delay	 (see	 Table	 3).	 	 Importantly,	 a	significant	interaction	ASD	status	x	Tap	Delay	was	found,	F	(4,	47)	=	3.47,	p	=	.04,	
η2p		 =	 .07,	which	means	 that	 the	 effect	 of	 Delay	 on	RTs	was	 different	 for	 each	
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group.	To	test	the	robustness	of	the	interaction	effect	specifically,	we	calculated	log-transformed	RT	values	and	repeated	the	Anova	with	these	new	values.	 	The	interaction	effect	was	borderline	significant	with	the	transformed	data,	F	(4,	47)	=	2.95,	p	=	.05,		η2p		=	.06.		To	analyse	this	further,	in	each	group,	we	ran	four	paired	samples	t-tests	to	compare	RTs	between	each	consecutive	delay	i.e.	we	compared	RT	at	300ms	with	 RT	 at	 800ms,	 RT	 at	 800ms	 with	 RT	 at	 1500ms	 etc.	 The	 alpha-level	 was	Bonferroni	corrected	to	p	=	.006	for	multiple	comparisons.	For	ASD	participants,	RTs	at	1500ms	were	significantly	faster	than	the	RTs	at	800ms,	t	(21)	=	3.62,	p	=	.002,	but	there	was	no	significant	difference	between	RTs	at	300ms	and	800ms,	t	(21)	=	1.86,	p	=	.08,	between	RTs	at	1500	and	2200ms,	t	(21)	=	2.49,	p	=	.02,	and	between	 RTs	 at	 2200ms	 and	 2500ms,	 t	 (21)	 =	 1.14,	 p	 =	 .27.	 	 For	 non-ASD	participants,	RTs	at	800ms	were	significantly	faster	than	RTs	at	300ms,	t	(26)	=	3.16,	p		=	.004,	but	there	was	no	significant	difference	between	RTs	at	800ms	and	1500ms,	t	(26)	=	1.61,	p	=	.12,	between	RTs	at	1500	and	2200ms,	t	(26)	=	0.82,	p	=	.42,	and	between	RTs	at	2200ms	and	2500ms,	t	(26)	=	2.66,	p	=	.01.	This	means	that	 in	the	two	groups,	 tactile	processing	 is	differently	boosted	by	co-occurring	sounds,	 with	 a	 facilitation	 effect	 of	 sound	 on	 RTs	 occurring	 between	 800	 and	1500ms	 for	ASD	participants,	whereas	 for	non-ASD	participants	 the	 facilitation	occurred	 between	300	 and	800ms.	 In	 this	way,	 if	we	 take	 the	 critical	 distance	where	 the	 sound	 speeds	 up	 tactile	 RTs	 as	 a	 proxy	 of	 the	 PPS	 boundary	(Canzoneri	et	al.,	2012;	Teneggi	et	al.,	2013),	we	can	conclude	that	the	PPS	size	of	ASD	participants	is	smaller.			
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Table	3.	Reaction	time	(in	ms)	at	tap	delay	after	sound	onset,	for	ASD	and	non-ASD	
participants.	Tap	Delay	 300ms	
M	(SD)	 800ms	M	(SD)	 1500ms	M	(SD)	 2200ms	M	(SD)	 2500ms	M	(SD)	Non-ASD	 1109	(107)	 1070	(104)	 1043	(80)	 1037	(74)	 1017	(73)	ASD	 1272	(286)	 1220	(216)	 1147	(218)	 1112	(198)	 1093	(183)		 Using	a	MATLAB	curve	fitting	tool,	we	fitted	the	data	of	the	two	groups	to	a	 linear	 function	 to	 assess	 if	 the	 slope	 of	 the	 PPS	 gradient	 as	 the	 sound	approached	was	steeper	for	ASD	participants	than	for	non-ASD	participants.	The	linear	function	was	described	by	the	following	equation:	y(x)	=	y0	+	kx,	where	x	represents	the	tap	delay,	y	the	RT,	y0		the	intercept	at	x	=	0,	and	k	the	slope	of	the	function.	After	removing	the	data	of	individuals	with	a	poor	fit	(adjusted	R2	<	0.2,	6	participants	in	each	group)	the	ASD	linear	equation	could	be	described	as	y	=	1340	–	0.11x,	and	the	non-ASD	linear	equation	could	be	described	at	y	=	1142	–	0.05x.	 Importantly,	 the	 slope	 of	 the	 function	was	 significantly	 different	 for	 the	two	 groups,	 t	 (33)	 =	 2.67,	 p	 =	 .01,	 with	 the	 slope	 of	 ASD	 participants	 being	steeper	(k	=	-0.11)	than	the	slope	of	non-ASD	participants	(k	=	-.05).	See	Figure	5.	[Insert	Figure	5]	
	
(v)	Correlations		Relationships	 between	 illusion	 strength	 in	 the	 body	 conditions,	 drift	 in	 self-location,	 PPS	 slope	 and	 questionnaire	 measures	 of	 interoceptive	 awareness,	autistic	 traits,	 empathy	 and	 alexithymia	 were	 investigated	 with	 Spearman	correlations	 for	 the	 full	 sample	of	participants.	 Illusion	strength	 -	 calculated	as	the	 subtracted	 score	 (synch-asynch)	 for	 Q3	 (self-identification)	 in	 the	 body	
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condition	 -	 showed	 a	 significant	 negative	 correlation	 with	 severity	 of	 autistic	traits	 and	 a	 significant	 positive	 correlation	 with	 empathy	 ratings.	 No	 other	correlations	were	significant	(see	Table	4).		
Table	4.	Spearman’s	correlations	and	p-values	of	the	subtracted	FBI	scores	(synchronous	–	
asynchronous)	 for	 self-location	drift	 and	 combined	 illusion	questions	 ratings	 in	 the	body	
condition,	 Question	 3	 (self-identification),	 and	 PPS	 slope,	 with	 scores	measuring	 autistic	
traits	(AQ),	alexithymia	(TAS20)	and	empathy	(QCAE)	and	interoceptive	awareness	(MAIA	
subscales)			 Drift	 Illusion	Questions		 Q3	 PPS	slope			 Rho	 p	 	rho	 p	 rho	 p	 rho	 p	Autistic	traits	 0.23	 .11	 -0.27	 .07	 -0.46	 .001*	 -0.10	 .51	Alexithymia	 -0.08	 .59	 -0.27	 .08	 -0.26	 .06	 -0.11	 .48	Empathy	 0.26	 .08	 0.37	 .01	 0.49	 <	.001*	 0.05	 .75				Cognitive	Empathy	 0.25	 .09	 0.36	 .01	 0.47	 <	.001*	 0.12	 .45				Affective	Empathy	 0.07	 .64	 0.13	 .37	 0.18	 .22	 -0.19	 .20	MAIA	Noticing	 -0.07	 .67	 0.21	 .16	 0.22	 .14	 -0.06	 .69	MAIA	 Attention	regulation	 .11	 .46	 0.18	 .23	 0.27	 .07	 0.12	 .44	Note:	*	p	<	.002	(Bonferroni	corrected	alpha	level)	
	To	 address	 the	 hypothesis	 that	 bodily	 self-consciousness	 may	 contribute	 to	empathy,	 we	 conducted	 a	 stepwise	 multiple	 regression,	 with	 the	 predictor	variables	of	autistic	traits	(AQ),	alexithymia	(TAS-20),	IQ	scores	and	the	scores	of	FBI		self-identification	(Q3),	and	with	empathy	scores	(QCAE)	as	the	dependent	
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variable.	 	 This	 showed	 that	 autistic	 traits	 and	 FBI	 self-identification	 are	significant	predictors	of	empathy,	F	(2,	44)	=	42.27,	p	<	.001,	explaining	66%	of	the	variance	of	empathy.	The	relationship	between	autistic	traits	and	empathy	is	negative,	 while	 the	 relationship	 between	 self-identication	 and	 empathy	 is	positive.	Alexithymia	and	IQ	do	not	significantly	explain	any	additional	variance	of	empathy	after	AQ	and	Q3	scores	were	modelled.	See	Table	5	for	the	regression	coefficients.			Table	5.		Regression	model	showing	the	contributions	of	autistic	traits	(AQ)	and	FBI	self-identification	(Q3)	to	empathy	(QCAE).			 	 B	 SE	B	 β	Step	1	 	 	 	 		 Constant	 110.55	 3.24	 		 AQ	 -1.06	 0.13	 -.78***	Step	2	 	 	 	 		 Constant	 100.32	 5.44	 		 AQ	 -0.95	 0.13	 -.71***		 Q3	 1.58	 0.69	 .22*	Note:	*p	<	.05;		***p	<	.001	R2	=	.62,	p	<	.001	for	Step	1.	ΔR2		=	.04,	p	=	.03	for	Step	2.			
	
Discussion	
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In	 the	 present	 study	 we	 investigated	 bodily	 self-consciousness	 in	 ASD	 by	measuring	 responses	 to	 the	 full	 body	 illusion	 and	 the	 extent	 of	 PPS	 in	participants	with	 the	 condition.	 Overall	 our	 results	 show	 that	 individuals	with	ASD	are	much	 less	 susceptible	 to	 the	FBI	 than	 are	 typical	 control	 participants.	Consistent	 with	 this,	 our	 data	 also	 show	 that	 the	 PPS	 of	 ASD	 participants	 is	smaller	 and	 shows	 a	 steeper	 gradient	 at	 its	 boundary,	 indicating	 a	 more	pronounced	 self-other	distinction	 in	ASD.	The	 representation	of	 the	bodily	 self	therefore	 seems	 to	 be	 less	malleable	 in	 ASD	 participants	 and	 these	 ‘low-level’	differences	 in	 self	may	 relate	 to	 (and	 partly	 underlie)	 the	 ability	 to	 empathise	with	others.			 The	 FBI	 data	 show	 that	 agreement	 with	 illusion	 statements	 was	signfiicantly	 higher	 in	 synchronous	 than	 asynchronous	 body	 conditions	 in	 the	non-ASD	group	–	as	found	previously	(Aspell	et	al.,	2012;	2013;	Cowie,	McKenna,	Bremner,	&	Aspell,	2017;	Ionta	et	al.,	2011;	Lenggenhager	et	al.,	2007)	-	but	did	not	 differ	 in	 the	 ASD	 group.	 Moreover,	 neurotypical	 participants	 showed	significantly	greater	self-identification	with	the	virtual	body	in	the	synchronous	condition	 and	 a	 greater	 self-location	 drift	 towards	 the	 virtual	 body	 during	 the	synchronous	condition,	but	this	was	not	 found	for	ASD	participants.	 In	keeping	with	this	we	found	a	strong	and	highly	significant	negative	correlation	of	autistic	traits	with	self-identification	ratings.		 Surprisingly,	 non-ASD	 participants	 also	 responded	 with	 higher	 ratings	after	synchronous	stroking	on	the	summated	illusion	questionnaire	items	and	on	the	self-identification	item	Q3,	in	the	object	condition.	However,	the	actual	score	of	these	participants	in	the	object	condition	on	Q3	indicated	negative	agreement	with	the	statement	(lower	than	4	which	equates	to	the	neutral	point),	and	only	in	
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the	 body	 condition	 did	 they	 positively	 agree	 with	 the	 Q3	 self-identification	statement.	Similarly,	ASD	participants	showed	higher	scores	in	the	synchronous	condition	than	the	asynchronous	condition	for	the	summated	illusion	scores.	But	their	 score	 on	 Q3	 in	 the	 synchronous	 object	 condition	 was	 also	 below	 4,	 and	therefore	 a	 negative	 agreement.	 In	 summary,	 only	 non-ASD	 participants	identified	more	with	the	virtual	body	after	synchronous	stroking,	while	neither	group	 identified	 with	 the	 object.	 This	 suggests	 that,	 whereas	 non-ASD	participants	 have	 a	 tendency	 to	 self-identify	with	 the	 virtual	 body	 and	 localise	their	self	closer	to	it	following	synchronous	stimulation,	ASD	participants	do	not	appear	 to	 have	 a	 bodily	 self	 representation	 that	 adapts	 to	 changes	 in	multisensory	 input	 so	 readily.	 This	 is	 in	 line	 with	 the	 finding	 that	 ASD	participants	show	a	lower	susceptibility	to	the	RHI	(Cascio	et	al.,	2012;	Paton	et	al.,	 2012),	 and	 suggests	 that	 ASD	 participants	 have	 an	 altered	 bodily	 self	representation	that	encompasses	their	whole	body.		 Confirming	 our	 other	 hypotheses,	 	 and	 in	 line	 with	 recent	 predictions	about	 the	 slope	 of	 PPS	 in	 ASD	 (Noel	 et	 al.,	 2017),	 the	 results	 of	 the	 PPS	 task	demonstrated	 that	ASD	participants	exhibited	a	steeper	slope	 in	 their	RTs	as	a	function	of	 the	 temporal	delay	of	 the	 tap,	 as	 the	 sound	approached	 their	body.	Also,	their	PPS	boundary	was	closer	to	the	body	than	for	non-ASD	participants.	A	smaller	 PPS	 may	 partly	 underlie	 certain	 behaviours	 sometimes	 seen	 in	individuals	 with	 ASD,	 such	 as	 approaching	 others	 closer	 than	 social	 norms	prescribe,	 or	 having	 difficulty	 considering	 communications	 outside	 personal	space	as	directed	 towards	 themselves	 (Asada	et	 al.,	 2016;	Kennedy	&	Adolphs,	2014;	Parsons	et	al.,	2004).			
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The	reduced	susceptibility	to	the	FBI	we	found	for	ASD	participants	fits	with	the	steeper	PPS	slope	of	these	participants	and	may	indicate	a	generally	less	flexible	representation	of	the	bodily	self.	The	slope	of	the	PPS	indicates	the	distance	over	which	 the	 facilitatory	 effect	 	 on	 RT	 via	 the	 integration	 of	 touch	 and	 sound	manifests:	 	 it	occurs	over	a	greater	distance	in	a	shallow	slope	than	it	does	in	a	steep	slope	(found	for	ASD	participants).	Therefore	conceptually,	the	slope	of	the	PPS		may	indicate	the	flexibility	of	the	boundary	between	one’s	self	and	an	other	(Noel	et	al.,	2017).	It	has	been	shown	that	PPS	extends	towards	others	in	social	interactions	(Teneggi	et	al.,	2013)	and	 that	others’	PPS	can	even	sometimes	be	remapped	onto	one’s	own	 (Maister	et	 al.,	 2015).	Having	a	 steeper,	 less	 flexible	boundary	 between	 self	 and	 other	 would	 mean	 that	 the	 PPS	 boundary	 of	individuals	with	ASD	would	not	change	to	the	same	extent	in	social	interactions	or	during	shared	sensory	experiences.		A	 limitation	 of	 the	 study	 however	 is	 that	 our	 results	 refer	 to	 the	 “peri-hand”	PPS,	and	not	to	the	“full	body”	PPS	 	that	can	be	measured	by	stimulating	the	 trunk	 (Serino	 et	 al.,	 2015).	 Therefore	 our	 conclusions	 about	 the	 PPS	modulation	in	ASD	participants	only	relate	to	the	peri-hand	portion	of	the	space	around	the	body.	A	recent	paper	by	Serino	et	al.	(2015),	showed	that	the	PPS	size	changes	according	to	the	body	part	around	which	the	PPS	is	measured	(i.e.	face	or	 hand	 or	 trunk),	 with	 the	 hand-PPS	 being	 the	 smallest,	 the	 face-PPS	 being	larger	 and	 the	 trunk-PPS	 the	 largest.	 This	 is	 thought	 to	 reflect	 the	 different	portions	 of	 space	 in	which	 a	 body	 part	mostly	 interacts	with	 external	 objects:	whereas	the	hand	interacts	with	objects	in	a	very	limited	area,	i.e.	only	when	the	hand	 is	 touching	 an	 object,	 the	 trunk	 is	 usually	 involved	 in	 interactions	 that	occur	 over	 a	 larger	 area.	 Despite	 the	 different	 sizes	 of	 the	 body-part	 centered	
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PPSs,	we	 expect	 the	 full-body	 PPS	 in	 ASD	 participants	 to	 be	modulated	 as	 the	peri-hand	 one,	 i.e.	 being	 smaller	 in	 ASD	 than	 in	 non-ASD	 participants.	 This	 is	because	the	sizes	of	different	body-part	PPSs	are	not	 fully	 independent	of	each	other	 (Serino	 et	 al.,	 2015),	 and	 is	 in	 line	with	 our	 interpretation	 and	 previous	studies,	that	the	smaller	PPS	in	ASD	participants	may	reflect	their	often-observed	anomalous	social	interactions	-	such	as	‘invading’	others’	personal	space	-	where	the	whole	body	as	well	as	 the	hands	are	similarly	 involved	(Asada	et	al.,	2016;	Kennedy	&	Adolphs,	2014;	Parsons	et	al.,	2004).				 An	explanation	for	the	reduced	susceptibility	to	the	FBI	in	ASD	is	offered	by	 findings	 that	 individuals	with	 ASD	 have	 a	wider	 temporal	 binding	window	(TBW)	 in	 which	 temporally	 close	 sensory	 signals	 are	 “bound”	 into	 a	 single	perceived	 event	 (Greenfield,	 Ropar,	 Smith,	 Carey,	 &	 Newport,	 2015;	 Kwakye,	Foss-Feig,	 Cascio,	 Stone,	 &	 Wallace,	 2011;	 Noel,	 Stevenson,	 &	 Wallace,	 2018;	Stevenson	 et	 al.,	 2014).	 A	 wider	 TBW	 would	 impair	 the	 ability	 to	 integrate	multisensory	 information	 and	 may	 lead	 to	 a	 lower	 ability	 to	 discriminate	between	 the	 synchronous	 and	 asynchronous	 conditions	 of	 body	 illusions.	 This	explanation	 is	 supported	 by	 our	 findings	 that	 on	 all	 measures,	 the	 difference	between	 the	 synchronous	 and	 asynchronous	 condition	 was	 smaller	 for	 ASD	participants.		Additionally,	 it	has	been	 suggested	–	 following	 the	 finding	of	 an	 inverse	relationship	 between	 interoceptive	 sensitivity	 and	 susceptibility	 to	 the	 RHI	(Tsakiris	et	al.	2011)	–	that	an	individual’s	bodily	self	is	more	robust	and	stable	if	interoceptive	 cues	 are	 more	 accurately/precisely	 represented	 relative	 to	exteroceptive	stimuli,		making	them	less	susceptible	to	body	illusions	(Palmer	&	Tsakiris,	2018;	Tajadura-Jiménez	&	Tsakiris,	2014;	Tsakiris,	Tajadura-Jimenez,	&	
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Costantini,	2011).	 In	a	predictive	coding	approach,	Palmer	and	Tsakiris	 (2018)	propose	 that	 probabilistic	 representions	 of	 the	 bodily	 self	 emerge	 from	 the	integration	of	 top-down	predictions	and	bottom-up	prediction	errors	across	all	modalities,	 including	interoceptive.	They	suggest	that	the	balance	in	saliency	of	interoceptive	 relative	 to	 exteroceptive	 prediction	 errors	 will	 determine	 the	malleability	of	the	representation	of	self,	with	the	interoceptive	prediction	errors	providing	 stability	 and	 continuity	 of	 the	 representation	 of	 self	 in	 the	 face	 of	exteroceptive	uncertainty.	 	 In	this	account,	 the	brains	of	 individuals	with	 lower	interoceptive	 accuracy	 would	 rely	 less	 on	 the	 prediction	 errors	 generated	 by	interoceptive	senses,	awarding	more	saliency	to	exteroceptive	signals.	Therefore	representations	 of	 self	 would	 be	 updated	 based	 on	 conflicting	 exteroceptive	signals,	thus	generating	stronger	body	illusions.	The	opposite	would	be	true	for	individuals	with	high	interoceptive	accuracy.		However,	 in	 the	 present	 study	 we	 did	 not	 find	 relationships	 between	susceptibility	 to	 the	 FBI	 and	 interoceptive	 awareness.	 Furthermore,	 autistic	individuals	tend	to	have	 lower	 interoceptive	sensitivity	and	awareness	than	the	typical	population	(DuBois,	Ameis,	Lai,	Casanova,	&	Desarkar,	2016;	Mul,	Stagg,	Herbelin,	&	Aspell,	2018;	Shah,	Hall,	Catmur,	&	Bird,	2016),	yet	our	findings	are	in	line	with	previous	research	that	shows	that	they	are	 less	susceptible	to	body	illusions,	not	more	(Cascio	et	al.,	2012;	Guerra	et	al.,	2017;	Paton	et	al.,	2012).	It	is	 worth	 noting	 that	 an	 exceptionally	 wide	 temporal	 binding	 window	 for	interoceptive	and	exteroceptive	 (cardio-visual)	signals	has	been	shown	 in	ASD.	This	 	may	 affect	 the	 balance	 of	 interoceptive	 and	 exteroceptive	 processing	 	 in	terms	of		saliency	and	integration	(Noel,	Lytle,	Cascio,	&	Wallace,	2018).		Our	ASD	participants	 scored	 significantly	 lower	 on	 the	 MAIA	 dimension	 of	 Attention	
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Regulation	which	captures	how	well	individuals	can	control	or	maintain	focus	on	interoceptive	sensations.	Thus,	individuals	with	ASD	may	be	less	able	to	sustain	attention	to	interoceptive	signals.		Taken	 together,	 these	 findings	 support	 suggestions	 that	 the	 saliency	 of	interoceptive	 vs	 exteroceptive	prediction	 errors	may	differ	 in	ASD	 (Noel	 et	 al.,	2018),	 and/or	 that	 the	 strength	 of	 top-down	 predictions	 (priors)	 versus	 the	saliency	of	bottom-up	sensory	prediction	errors	is	different,	as	proposed	by	the	so-called	hypo-prior	model	of	autism	(Lawson,	Rees,	&	Friston,	2014;	Pellicano	&	Burr,	 2012).	 Usually,	 the	 experience	 of	 the	 full	 body	 illusion	 results	 from	 an	optimal	top-down	resolution	(update)	to	the	prediction	errors	the	multisensory	conflict	 of	 the	 illusion	 generates.	 However,	 it	 has	 been	 proposed	 that	 in	 ASD	bottom-up	sensory	signals	outweigh	top-down	priors:	an	inflexibility	in	adapting	higher	 order	 cognitions	 to	 novel	 sensory	 signals	 results	 (Lawson	 et	 al.,	 2014;	Lawson,	Mathys,	&	Rees,	2017).	This	might	explain	both	a	 less	 flexible	sense	of	bodily	 self	 as	 evidenced	 by	 a	 reduced	 susceptibility	 to	 the	 FBI,	 and	 a	 reduced	flexibility	in	self-other	boundaries		as	suggested	by	our	finding	of	a	steeper	slope	of	the	PPS	boundary.	It	is	worth	noting	that	these	findings	are	in	line	with	suggestions	that	a	low-level	mechanism	that	differentiates	between	representations	of	self	and	other	may	be	anomalous	in	ASD	(Lamm,	Bukowski	&	Silani,	2016;	Lombardo		et	al.,	2010;	Sowden	&	Shah,	2014).	In	particular,	it	is	widely	agreed	that	successful	social	interactions	are	reliant	on	the	ability	to	flexibly	switch	between	neural	representations	of	self	and	others.	This	mechanism,	referred	to	as	“self-other	control”	(Decety	&	Sommerville,	2003),	has	been	hypothesised	to	be	altered	in	ASD	participants	(Cook	&	Bird,	2012).	Importantly,	several	studies	have	tried	to	
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identify	the	neural	basis	of	this	“self-other	control”	mechanism,	reaching	a	widely	agreed	conclusion	that	the	two	main	areas	involved	are	the	medial	prefrontal	cortex	and	the	temporoparietal	junction	(Brass,	Ruby,	&	Spengler,	2009;	Spengler,	von	Cramon,	&	Brass,	2009).	These	regions	are	critical	in	mentalizing,	theory	of	mind	and	perspective	taking,	i.e.	in	those	processes	for	which	a	flexible	yet	well-controlled	distinction	between	self	and	others	is	needed.		We	therefore	speculate	-	given	the	purely	behavioural	nature	of	our	investigation	–	that	a	dysfunction	in	these	key	regions	for	controlling	self-other	distinction	underpins	the	observed	reduced	malleability	of	bodily	self-representations	in	ASD	participants	(Lombardo	et	al.,	2010;	Uddin,	2011).   	 Our	final	hypothesis,	that	altered	bodily	self-consciousness	would	be	related	to	social	functioning	in	ASD	is	supported	by	our	findings.	The	strength	of	 the	experienced	 illusion	as	 indicated	by	 the	 self-identification	question	 (Q3)	was	negatively	 related	 to	 autistic	 traits	 and	positively	 related	 to	 empathy.	Our		multiple	 regression	 showed	 that	 both	 autistic	 traits	 and	 the	 tendency	 to	 self-identify	with	the	vitual	body	contributed	significantly	to	empathy	scores.	 	 	 	This	link	 with	 empathy	 suggests	 that	 altered	 bodily	 self-consciousness	 has	 social	implications.	Empathy	involves	the	understanding	and	sharing	of		the	emotion	of	an	other,	a	process	in		which	one’s	own	emotional	experience	and	that	observed	in	 an	 other	 are	 both	 neurally	 represented	 (Bird	 &	 Viding,	 2014;	 Decety	 &	Jackson,	 2006;	 Sowden	 &	 Shah,	 2014).	 We	 can	 speculate	 that	 the	 reduced	flexibility	 of	 bodily	 self-representation	 in	 ASD	 may	 hamper	 the	 ability	 to	represent	another	flexibly	as	well.	Indeed,	the	social	environment	provides	more	unpredictable	and	novel	situations	than	any	other,	and	it	has	been	suggested	that	consequences	 of	 altered	 predictive	 coding	 in	 the	 brain	 are	 not	 restricted	 to	
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perception,	but	also	affect	aspects	of	behaviour	and	social	interaction	(Balsters	et	al.,	2016;	Kilner,	Friston,	&	Frith,	2007;	Lawson	et	al.,	2014;	Palmer,	Lawson,	&	Hohwy,	2017).		However,	 it	was	 somewhat	 surprising	 to	 find	 that,	 in	 our	 sample,	while	autistic	 traits	 and	 the	 tendency	 to	 self-identify	 with	 the	 virtual	 body	 did	contribute	to	empathy,	alexithymia	did	not	contribute	significantly	to	empathy	in	our	multiple	regression	model,	which	is	in	contrast	to	previous	results	(e.g.	Bird,	et	al.,	2010;	Mul	et	al.,	2018;	Shah	et	al.,	2016).	This	may	be	due	to	differences	in	the	 way	 empathy	 was	 measured,	 i.e.	 state	 empathy	 for	 pain	 specifically	 in	response	 to	 visual	 stimuli	 vs	 trait	 empathy	 by	 questionnaire.	 Alternatively,	 or	additionally,	our	sample	may	not	have	been	large	enough	to	find	a	relationship.	Mul	 and	 colleagues	 (2018)	 and	 Aaron	 and	 colleagues	 (2015)	 did	 find	 a	relationship	 between	 empathy	 and	 alexithymia,	which	was	 partly	 independent	from	 the	 relationship	 with	 autistic	 traits,	 all	 of	 which	 were	 measured	 by	questionnaire,	the	latter	in	a	sample	of	139	non-ASD	adults.		We	note	a	number	of	limitations	of	the	present	study.	The	use	of	self-report	measures	of	emotion	understanding,	although	widely	used,	may	produce		unreliable	(underestimated	or	overestimated)	responses	from	some	ASD	participants.	In	this	vein,	it	would	be	useful	if	future	studies	use	an	additional	implicit	measure	of	susceptibility	to	the	FBI,	such	as	changes	in	skin	temperature	(Salomon,	Lim,	Pfeiffer,	Gassert	&	Blanke,	2013),	skin	conductance	response	to	threat	to	the	virtual	body	(Ehrsson	et	al.,	2008)	or	crossmodal	congruency	effects	(Aspell,	Lenggenhager	&	Blanke,	2009).	The	relatively	small	size	of	our	sample,	and	the	fact	that	our	non-ASD	group	did	not	have	similar	levels	of	alexithymia	as	the	ASD	group,	means	that	our	study	is	limited	in	regard	to	
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conclusions	that	can	be	drawn	on	the	contributions	of	alexithymia	and	autistic	traits	to	empathy.				 	In	conclusion,	our	findings	suggest	that	individuals	with	ASD	have	altered	bodily	self-consciousness,	likely	due	to	differences	in	multisensory	integration,	which	may	have	a	cascading	effect	on	social	functioning.	Participants	with	ASD	showed	reduced	susceptibility	to	the	FBI	and	had	a	smaller	PPS	with	a	steeper	slope	than	control	participants.	These	results	might	be	explained	by	wider	temporal	binding	windows	in	ASD	and/or	a	hypo-prior	predictive	coding	account	of		autism,	and	may	be	compounded	by	impairments	in	mechanisms	underlying	“self-other	control”	(Decety	&	Sommerville,	2003)	in	autism.	We	 suggest	 that	 the	 observed	 differences	 may	 be	 indicative	 of	 a	 less	flexible	representation	of	the	bodily	self	in	ASD.	The	integration	of	interoceptive	and	 exteroceptive	 signals	 and	 the	 contribution	 of	 these	 integrated	 signals	 to	bodily	 self-consciousness	 may	 also	 differ	 in	 ASD,	 and	 this	 warrants	 further	investigation.	 Lastly,	 further	 research	 into	 if	 and	 how	 an	 altered	 bodily	 self	affects	higher	order	self-processing	would	also	be	informative,	as	this	would	not	only	 increase	our	understanding	of	autism	and	other	disorders	of	self,	but	also	deepen	our	insight	into	the	nature	of	self.		
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